Introduction
The area of worship cannot be delineated from social, political, culture, and other areas of Indian lifestyle, including his general outlook upon economic and resource development .... [Wlorship is... an integral part of the Indian way of life and culture which cannot be separated from the whole. This oneness of Indian life seems to be the basic difference between the Indian and non-Indians of a dominant society.'
In his statement before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Mr. Barney Old Coyote of the Crow Tribe of Montana underlined the issues that continue to vex legislative, administrative, and judicial efforts to deal with matters relating to the religious practices of American Indians. The various tribal religions practiced by native peoples in the United States are almost without exception inextricably linked with what non-Indian society regards as culture.' This unity of culture and religion makes American Indian forms of worship alien and difficult for the non-Indian to understand' and poses difficult questions for AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 10 courts 4 that must decide whether certain arguably religious practices of American Indians lie within the shelter of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.' Various courts have responded to this challenge with conflicting conclusions about which American Indian practices are indeed religious and which are merely expressions of culture or personal preference unprotected by the first amendment. ' The conquest and oppression of the American Indian tribes by the white man was a shameful episode in our national history, an enterprise so unworthy of a nation that holds itself forth as the champion of liberty and democracy that it is difficult to imagine any but the most hardened and cynical disciple of manifest destiny who today would be unwilling to join in the consensus that regards the treatment of the American Indian by the white man with shame and horror. 7 What is not as widely recognized or understood, however, is that the lingering effect of oppression has had a lasting and pervasive impact on Indian religions as they to others in a particular way. Unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life and an inherent suspicion of fraud when religious doctrine and practice are not crisply defined by ancient writings or a central authority are obstacles to judicial understanding and protection of Indian religion. 95-341, 8-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] for a thorough and sensitive analysis of the nature of American Indian tribal religion and its intimate relation (if not identity) with tribal culture.
4. GETCHES, supra note 3, at 507-08: "the struggle to categorize neatly what Indians are moved to do by their traditions ... [illuminates] the difficulty our legal system has in applying constitutional protections to a strange culture's value system and spiritual life." 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ."
6. Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (state law banning possession and use of peyote may not be enforced against practicing member of Native American Church) with State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975) , cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (state law banning possession and use of peyote may be enforced against practicing member of Native American Church). Compare Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975 ) (wearing of long hair by Indian is a religious practice protected against state interference by the first amendment) with New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973 (wearing of long hair by Indian is not a religious practice and is therefore not protected against state interference by the first amendment The long history of oppression of the American Indian continues today. It is a bitter irony that this history makes it increasingly difficult for American Indians to assert successfully the right to practice their religion free from government interference, government interference having already so effectively alienated them from their tribal religions.' 2 Much of this interference has been incidental to the goals of the legislation or regulation that has impinged on the religious practices of American Indians, but the impact is real nevertheless: A lack of U.S. governmental policy has allowed infringement in the practice of native traditional religions. These infringements came about through the enforcement of policies ... which are basically sound and which the large majority of Indians strongly support.... But, because such laws were not Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 Educ., 414 U.S. , 1101 Educ., 414 U.S. -1103 Educ., 414 U.S. (1973 ] describes has been so effective in suppressing Indian culture that traditional practices emerge only in isolated instances, lacking in the consistency that generally marks a religious practice.
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intended to relate to religion and because there was a lack of awareness of their effect on religion, Congress neglected to fully consider the impact of such laws on the Indians' religious practices.
It is only within the last decade that it has become apparent that such laws, when combined with more restrictive regulations, insensitive enforcement procedures and administrative policy directives, in fact, have interfered severely with the culture and religion of American Indians.' 3 This article will discuss two recent appellate court decisions 4 that have had precisely this impact on the religious practices of two great Indian nations, the Cherokee and the Navajo. In each case, tribal representatives alleged that the inundation by federal water projects of sites sacred to the traditional tribal religions was an unconstitutional infringement of their first amendment right freely to exercise their religion. In both cases the courts ruled against the Indians. This article will suggest that the results of both cases were, in a practical sense, inevitable, though both courts failed to address the constitutional question raised by the Indians in a principled and constitutionally defensible manner. This article will also examine briefly the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978,'" raised by both tribes as a statutory claim, concluding that the statute is no more than a statement of good intentions and otherwise impotent as an instrument for righting the constitutional wrongs suffered by American Indians in their efforts to practice their religion free from government interference. If the lands are flooded, the medicine that comes from Chota will be ended because the strength and spiritual power of the Cherokee will be destroyed ....
I. The Cherokee
If this land is flooded and these sacred places are destroyed, the knowledge and beliefs of my people who are in the ground will be destroyed.
19. See id., Exhibits C-GG, Affidavits of Affiants. Albert L. Wahrhaftig, Chairman, Department of Anthropology, Sonoma State University, testified:
In short, to attempt to understand or maintain Cherokee religion without access to known and significant sites in the 'old country' would be like attempting to understand and practice Judaism or Christianity without the Book of Genesis. These sites represent the ultimate foundation of Cherokee belief and practice, now, and for the future. Emmaline Driver stated: "If they are flooded, our spiritual strength from our forefathers will be taken away from us, along with the origin of our organized religion. The white man has taken nearly everything away from us, our heritage, culture, traditions, and our way of life that is our religion." Richard Crowe stated:
This land is sacred to me and my people, and it is hard for me to talk about how I feel about this land. I have been going to the lands at Tellico for many years, for at least more than thirty (30) years. Before I went myself, I used to hear my people, my parents, speak of the land. My people referred to it in the Cherokee language. After rejecting plaintiffs' statutory arguments, the court addressed plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
24
The court assumed that "the land to be flooded is considered sacred to the Cherokee religion and that active practitioners of that religion would want to make pilgrimages to this land as a precept of their religion." ' 2 Nevertheless, it held that the free exercise clause of the first amendment did not require that injunctive relief be granted to the Cherokee plaintiffs. 26 Citing eight Supreme Court free exercise decisions, the court summarized the elements of a free exercise claim in two short sentences: "An essential element to a claim under the free exercise clause is some form of governmental coercion of actions which are contrary to religious belief" and "This governmental coercion may take the form of pressuring or forcing individuals not to participate in 
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The court first found that the impoundment of the Tellico Reservoir would have no coercive effect on plaintiffs. Instead of proceeding systematically to determine if closing the dam would be a form of "pressuring or forcing individuals not to participate in religious practices," the court framed the second level of inquiry in terms so broad that it effectively encompassed the first inquiry. "The question thus becomes whether the denial of access to government-owned land considered sacred and necessary to plaintiffs' religious beliefs infringes the free exercise clause." '2 The inquiry thus posed delved no farther than the finding on the first question.
Having dodged the difficult second question, the court leaped to a legal non sequitur by holding that the absence of a property interest in the lands about to be inundated barred plaintiffs from asserting a free exercise claim in regard to those lands. "The Court has been cited to no case that engrains the free exercise clause with property rights.' '29 The second telling question the court had posited for analysis of free exercise claims remained unasked and unanswered. In support of its property interest analysis, the court cited precedent that held that the first amendment does not grant a right of entry to federal property that is normally closed to the public. 3 " The inapt analogy is particularly troubling when one considers the historical reasons for the Cherokees' inability to assert a property interest in lands on which their sacred sites and burial places lie: these former Cherokee lands were taken from them by a powerful government bent on conquest. 3 The court's reliance on this lack of a property interest is an insensitive, inequitable, and irresponsible evasion of the more difficult constitutional claim that the Indians raised. 28 . Id. at 612. 29. Id. 30. Id., citing Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972 . 31. "The Cherokee race was removed from Tennessee by the federal government in a series of political and military steps, but not before the Cherokees had developed deep religious, cultural and historical ties with their homeland." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. These lands are not now closed to the public. When they were in private hands, plaintiffs had no difficulty in gaining access to them. They will now be closed to the public only because government action will cause them to be inundated. Thus, the court's analogy to prison and military reservation cases in which plaintiffs sought to establish a first amendment forum in a place where none had been previously available to them or to others, and where reasonable time, place, and manner regulation On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. Because the district court had considered matters outside the pleadings, the court of appeals treated the district court's judgment granting defendant's motion for dismissal as one for summary judgment. 3 2 The appellate court, however, explicitly rejected the district court's holding that plaintiffs could not assert a first amendment claim to enjoin TVA from flooding the sacred valley because plaintiffs had no property interest in the lands that would be flooded. 3 The court of appeals then analyzed the troubling question avoided by the district court-whether the action of the Tennessee Valley Authority, in flooding land conceded to be sacred to the Cherokee, "pressur[ed] or forc[ed] individuals not to participate in religious practices." ' 3 4 The court began its inquiry by setting forth evidence in the record that tended to show that the claims of the plaintiffs were cultural rather than religious, 3 " implicitly accepting the dubious assumption that Indian culture may be distinguished from Indian religion.1 6 The court concluded from the more than twenty affidavits submitted in support of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief that plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally cultural rather than religious. 7 A careful reading of the affidavits, however, suggests that the court summarized carefully selected portions in order to undercut the religious foundation of plaintiffs' claim. 3 The court's strategy is clear: to address the free exercise question raised by plaintiffs and effectively ignored by the trial court, yet still affirm the trial court's judgment, it would have to show that plaintiffs' claims did not satisfy the constitutional standards for determining whether a belief is religious. The court erroneously assumed that characterization of plaintiffs' claims as cultural as 32. Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980 
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well as religious would place them beyond the bounds of the free exercise clause. But the Supreme Court has never held that a belief must be exclusively religious in order to qualify for first amendment protection. 39 The court's emphasis on the nonreligious element of plaintiffs' claims could not wholly obscure their religious content. 0 Forced to acknowledge a religious component, the court shifted its approach in an attempt to minimize the significance of that component by trivializing it. 4 " A misreading of the affidavits submitted to the trial court buttressed that trivialization. 2 Having rendered plaintiffs' claim a hybrid of culture and religion, the court ventured into an area it mistakenly believed constitutionally gray. It conceded without discussion that plaintiffs had met the threshold requirements that they did in fact have a religion and that they sincerely adhered to it. 3
"Centrality". A Spurious Constitutional Test
The court opened its analysis of the constitutional question by asserting that Sherbert v. Verner 44 Cherokees had made expeditions to the area, prompted for the most part by an understandable desire to learn more about their cultural heritage. Compare notes 18 and 19 supra. Indeed, the failure of plaintiffs' affiants to satisfy the court may well be simply a matter of felicity of language because it is particularly difficult to express the religious nature of an experience in words that convey clear meaning to someone who has not shared that experience. This predicament intensifies when the other sees the religious experience as something that corresponds more closely to his notion of culture than of religion. In this regard, consider the remarks of GErCHEs, supra note 3.
43. ligion. If a burden is found it must be balanced against the governmental interest, with the government being required to show an overriding or compelling reason for its action." This first step assesses the "quality of the claims"" 7 for which litigants are seeking free exercise protection.
In addressing this first question, the court relied on language in Yoder 8 and two state cases, Frank v. Alaska 49 and People v. Woody, 5 " to support its thesis that even if plaintiffs' claims were religious, they were not entitled to free exercise protection unless the disputed practices were central to the religion."' None of the cases, however, provides solid authority for the court's "centrality" test. Initially, simply on its facts, it is hard to see how the claim raised in Yoder can be said to be more "central" (and thus more religious for free exercise purposes) than the claim of the Sequoyah plaintiffs. In Yoder, unlike Woody, the court dealt with practices that were not worship or religious ritual. These practices could be seen as religious only by indulging in a generous and lengthy implicit syllogism: the survival of the Amish religion depends on the successful inculcation of Amish values in each new generation; if Amish children attend public school, they may fail to acquire sufficient Amish values so as to make them adhere to the faith; if young people do not adhere to the Amish faith, the Amish religion will not survive; therefore, inculcation of Amish values is a central tenet of the Amish religion. As this syllogism makes clear, the Yoder "centrality" test offered by the Sequoyah court is spurious at best. The truly central tenets of the Amish faith concern matters of ritual and faith, not the practical problems of guiding children through adolescence.
In contrast, the Sequoyah plaintiffs have asserted a much Rptr. 69 (1964) . 51. The court might also have relied on language in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406, to support its "centrality" argument, as there the Supreme Court found that Sherbert's belief that she could not work on Saturdays was "a cardinal principle of her religious faith." However, Sherbert did not establish a "centrality" rule. The Sherbert Court used "centrality" as useful evidence of sincerity; in Sequoyah, the court has readily conceded plaintiffs' sincerity. In Sherbert's terms, then, the "centrality" inquiry in Sequoyah is superfluous.
[Vol. 10 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol10/iss1/2 stronger claim to religious centrality. Their claims concern the home of their gods and the ultimate origins of the Cherokee people. Surely the Yoder claims are more "cultural" than those presented in Sequoyah. Moreover, if the Cherokee practices are no longer "intimately related to daily living ' 52 except for a few devoted believers, it is only because the government, which now seeks to reject the Cherokee claims as not sufficiently central to the Cherokee faith to qualify for first amendment protection, had in the past systematically worked to deprive the Cherokees of their connection with the land and their sacred religion, which has always been tied to the land. It is remarkable that the Cherokee religion has survived at all, given the powerful forces historically arrayed against it.
The Woody 53 and Frank" 4 courts found that certain practices of American Indians fell within the ambit of the free exercise clause. The Sequoyah court, however, used these cases not for their holdings but for their negative implications. Woody was a ground-breaking case. It recognized a free exercise exemption from a state ban on the use of peyote by a religious minority, the Native American Church, thus expanding free exercise thinking to encompass non-mainstream religions. Nevertheless, the holding was clearly a logical consequence of the Sherbert" decision.
Because the use of hallucinogenic drugs is a far more controversial issue than, say, the right to unemployment benefits claimed in Sherbert, the California court was careful to couch its opinion in narrow terms in order to preclude all but the strongest claims from staking out territory within the exemption. The Sequoyah court correctly remarked that Woody found peyote to "play a central role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church," that the peyote ceremony comprised "the cornerstone of the religion," 5 6 and that "'[tlo forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism."'" A degree of "centrality" equal to that of the practice examined in Woody should not be a necessary condition to a finding that a religious practice falls within the shelter of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, particularly in a case not involving the 52. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972 Frank v. Alaska 59 poses even more difficult problems for the Sequoyah court. In Frank the Alaska Supreme Court held that an Athabascan Indian was not subject to prosecution under the state game laws for taking a moose out of season in order to provide food for a traditional funeral feast. 6 " The court found that "[w]hile moose itself is not sacred, it is needed for proper observance of a sacred ritual which must take place soon after death occurs. Moose is the centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions." 6 ' The eating of moose meat at a funeral feast appears no more centrally religious than worshipping and gathering traditional medicinal plants at the site of the origin of the Cherokee people and their religion.
Furthermore, although Frank speaks in the language of "centrality," it clearly does not require "centrality" as a necessary condition to free exercise protection. The Frank court cited a 1975 Eighth Circuit opinion, Teterud v. Burns, 6 2 as sole federal authority speaking directly to the "centrality" issue. The Teterud court stated:
The appellant's argument appears to be premised on the theory that Teterud was required to prove that wearing long braided hair was an absolute tenet of the Indian religion practiced by all Indians. This is not the law. Proof that the practice is 58. See Note, Drug Laws, and Religious Freedom, 8 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 79, 95 (1980) . The student commentator suggests that the Woody "centrality" standard is constitutionally suspect and a dead end for future free exercise claims. The commentator argues that "present attitudes and legal standards constitute a distortion of first amendment religious liberties . . ." because the Woody "centrality" test sanctions intervention into religious life and freedom. The commentator contends that courts would better serve first amendment values if they followed Justice Jackson's advice " [to] have done with this business of judicially examining other people's faiths." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, suggests the commentator, if the Yoder family's "life-style," 406 U.S. at 215, is sheltered by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, so too is American Indian culture. Indian religion and culture are at least as closely interrelated as the religion and culture of the Amish." 59. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979 The Sequoyah court dismissed Teterud as arising in an inapposite factual context not applicable to Sequoyah." However, it failed to explain how Teterud differs conceptually from Yoder, Woody, Frank, and Sequoyah. 6 5 The court found that the Little Tennessee River valley was neither the "cornerstone" nor the "theological heart" of the Cherokee religion. Because the Cherokee plaintiffs established neither the "centrality or indispensability" of the valley to the practice of their religion nor the inseparability of their religious practices from their way of life, the court held that they failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 66 The court found that plaintiffs had instead merely stated a "personal preference" that did not rise to constitutional dimensions:
The overwhelming concern of the affiants appears to be related to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural development. It is damage to tribal and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observances, which appears to be at stake. The complaint asserts an "irreversible loss to the culture and history of the plaintiffs." Though cultural history and tradition are vitally important to any group of people, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 67 To the contrary, the affidavits that plaintiffs provided to the trial court 6 " demonstrate that their concern was primarily and pro-63. 522 F.2d at 360. 64. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163 n.2: "Typically they concern some official regulation of individual activity which infringes the right of a particular group or person to the free exercise of religion. E.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975 69 Further, even assuming that the court was correct on the facts, it was wrong on the law. There is no authority for its assertion that, in order to merit the protection of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, a religious practice must have its source exclusively in religious belief. 70 The Cherokee plaintiffs thus failed to pass the "quality of the claims" test, which the court set forth as the first of two steps in analyzing free exercise claims. 7 " The court concluded that "plaintiffs have not alleged infringement of a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment right." ' 2 Since plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first step of the analysis, the court did not consider the second, the balancing test: "In the absence of such an infringement, there is no need to balance the opposing interest of the parties or to determine whether the government's interest in proceeding with its plans for the Tellico Dam is 'compelling.' "v' On this basis, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. 74 
II. The Navajo Claim: Badoni v. Higginson
Rainbow Bridge National Monument is a 160-acre tract in southern Utah, entirely surrounded by the Navajo Indian Reservation. Within this tract is a remarkable sandstone arch, 309 feet high and spanning 278 feet, sacred to Navajos who adhere to the traditional tribal religion. 7 " Glen Canyon Dam, located fifty-eight miles below the sandstone arch on the Colorado River, was completed in 1963. The waters rising behind the dam to form the Lake Powell Reservoir have risen to reach the Monument. When the Lake Powell project is complete, there will be forty-six feet of water underneath the Bridge. Under the supervision and management of the National Park Service, boating facilities have been supplied to assist tourists in visiting the Monument as part of the 74. Judge Merritt dissented only on the ground that the case should be remanded for "plaintiffs to offer proof concerning the centrality of their ancestral burial grounds to their religion." Id. Judge Merritt fully accepted the "centrality" test and the majority's reasoning; he simply believed that summary judgment was not an appropriate resolution of this matter in which the record indicated that the factual matter of the "centrality" of plaintiff's religious practice allegedly infringed by the closing of the dam was in dispute.
75. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980 In 1974 eight individual Navajos, three of them medicine men recognized by their people, brought suit to enjoin the Bureau of Reclamation, the National Park Service, and the Department of the Interior from continuing to act in such a manner as to destroy and desecrate the Navajo gods and sacred sites threatened by the rising waters of Lake Powell and by the influx of tourists." The Navajo grounded their principal claim in the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 78 Intervening as defendants, agencies of the states of Utah and Colorado moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it." The pleadings of the Navajo plaintiffs set forth an elaborate ground for their first amendment claim for injunctive relief. 8 " However, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on two alternative grounds.' First, the court found that plaintiffs had no property interest in Rainbow Bridge National Monument and held that this lack of a property interest was dispositive of plaintiffs' claims. It cited no authority for the holding, stating only that " [tihe court feels that the lack of a property interest is determinative of the Certain geological formations in the Rainbow Bridge area have held positions of central importance in the religion of the Navajo people.., for at least 100 years. These shrines, which are regarded as the actual incarnate forms of Navajo gods, have performed protective and rain-giving functions for generations of Navajo singers.... Plaintiffs allege that the flooding of Bridge Canyon in the vicinity of Rainbow Bridge and the greatly increased tourist traffic due to defendants' actions have resulted in the following specific infringements upon plaintiffs' First Amendment rights: the destruction of holy sites; the drowning of entities recognized as gods by the plaintiffs; prevention of plaintiffs from performing religious ceremonies; desecration of holy sites, especially abodes of gods of the plaintiffs, by tourists; and, by virtue of all of this, injury to the efficacy of plaintiffs' religious prayers, and entreaties to their remaining gods ... Plaintiffs request this court to order defendants to take appropriate steps to operate Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir in such a manner that the important religious and cultural interests of plaintiffs will not be harmed or degraded, and to issue rules and regulations to prevent further destruction and desecration of the Rainbow Bridge area by tourists.
81. Id. at 644.
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tiffs have no cognizable claim under the circumstances presented." 82 The court held out as persuasive a hypothetical situation proposed by defendants that involved a plaintiff who petitioned a federal court to restrict public access to the Lincoln Memorial because he had had an intense religious experience there.1 3 The facile acceptance of defendants' hypothetical situation, however, ignores the difference between the claims of American Indians seeking to protect their religion and the situation described in the hypothetical. The Indians sought to vindicate old claims on territory that was once theirs for a religion that has its roots in the very origins of the Indian people; the Lincoln Memorial litigant could make no such claim. Recognition of the Navajo plaintiffs' first amendment claims would not have required a judgment in favor of defendants' hypothetical plaintiff. 8 4 The court then presented an alternative ground of decision. Its cramped view of the free exercise test required by Yoder, 8 " the difficulty of dismissing as nonreligious a claim that is on its face religious, and the superficial analysis and casual use of language in its first ground of decision led it into logical difficulties from which it failed to extricate itself.
The court began its analysis with the following statement: 84. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-12, for an analysis of the nature of the belief structure of American Indian religions. Defendants' analogy to an individual's spontaneous and contemporary religious experience is inappropriate, see id. at 88-98, although as a hypothetical case, it admittedly does raise troubling first amendment questions.
Id. at 12 states:
When the freedom of religion is discussed in the context of the tribal traditions, it is the right to adjust to and maintain relationships with the natural world and its inhabitants that is addressed .... The ceremonies and rites themselves set fairly precise rituals and reveal in the performance of the acts their continuing efficacy. While no future revelations can be ruled out, it would be the rarest of events for a new ceremony to be introduced. Except in the most remote areas of Indian country, the urbanization of North America has precluded both Indian and non-Indian from the constant relationship with the natural world that would be conducive to the revelation of further ceremonies. Plaintiffs fail, however, to demonstrate in any manner a vital relationship of the practices in question with the Navajo way of life or a "history of consistency" which would support their allegation of religious use of Rainbow Bridge in recent times.
In sum, the alleged interests of plaintiffs have not been established."
Applying the "deep religious significance," "intimately related to daily living," and "vital relationship" standards of Yoder, the court purported to hold that the Navajo lost the balancing test, when in fact it had held that the Navajo had not stated a religious claim under the free exercise clause. In support of its findings, the court pointed to two dispositive facts: first, the plaintiff medicine men were not "recognized by the Navajo Nation as such," their training was not "tribally organized," and it took place years ago; and second, the ceremonies were held too infrequently to qualify for constitutional protection. 9 The first assertion, however, was explicitly contradicted by a prior finding of the court 90 and, in any case, is meaningless when the relationship between tribal government and tribal religion is properly under- [Vol. 10 stood. 9 " The second assertion may be of some significance when considering a religious claim within the mainstream JudaeoChristian tradition, but it is irrelevant when applied to traditional religions of the American Indian. 9 2
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief and grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, it substituted for one of the district court's alternative grounds of decision one of its own. 93 The court cited Sequoyah to support its rejection of the district court's conclusion that the Navajos' lack of a property interest in the Monument denied them standing to claim free exercise protection. Further, the court implicitly rejected the notion that Yoder required the application of a "centrality test" 9 to free exercise challenges to government activity." The court did not attempt to demonstrate, It is the intent [of Congress in enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom Act] that that source [of information concerning Indian religious practices] be the practitioner of the religion, the medicine people, religious leaders, and traditionalist [sic] who are Natives-and not Indian experts, political leaders, or any other nonpractitioner.
92. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11:
The tribal religions do not incorporate a set of established truths but serve to perpetuate a set of rituals and ceremonies which must be conducted in accordance with the instructions given in the original revelation of each particular ceremony or ritual .... Unlike the larger religions, the ceremonial year did not commemorate specific chronological historical events, and some ceremonies were reserved for occasions that warranted them. Not all ceremonies needed to be performed each year in the manner that the Christian year follows the life and passion of Jesus, for example.
93. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 94. Id. at 176-77. 95 . Id. at 176: At the outset, we reject the conclusion that plaintiffs' lack of property rights in the Monument is determinative. The government must manage its property in a manner that does not offend the Constitution. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 , 1164 (6th Cir. 1980 ) (lack of property interest not conclusive, but is a factor in weighing free exercise and competing interests).
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as had the district court," 6 that the Navajo claims were not sufficiently "central" to qualify for first amendment protection, but rather held directly that "Rainbow Bridge and a nearby spring, prayer spot and cave have held positions of central importance in the religion of some Navajo people living in the area for at least 100 years."
The court then applied the balancing test mandated by Yoder 9 to the first of two injuries alleged by plaintiffs. Without extensive analysis, the court found that "the government's interest in maintaining the capacity of Lake Powell at a level that intrudes into the Monument outweighs plaintiffs' religious interest . . . . In these circumstances we believe the government has shown an interest of a magnitude sufficient to justify the alleged infringements." 99 The court saw no delicate balance. The interests of an entire section of the nation in managing scarce water resources simply could not be overborne by religious claims of American Indians.
Plaintiffs had also contended that the National Park Service's inadequate regulation of tourist behavior had infringed the free exercise of their religion. They sought "some measured accommodation" 00 by means of regulations to control the behavior of tourists at the Monument and thereby reduce the injury done to the Monument itself and to their religious practices. Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
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Monument for the benefit of the Navajo in the exercise of their traditional religion would run afoul of the establishment clause of the first amendment.' 0 7
The court supported its argument by noting that regulation of tourist behavior in order to protect Navajo religious practices at the Monument would infringe the right of the public to use the Monument for its own purposes. 108 The case law upon which the court relied to reach these two conclusions points consistently to contrary propositions. In support of its conclusion that there was danger of an establishment clause violation, the court cited only one case, School District of Abington v. Schempp. 0 9 The court there held that "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.'"1 For the proposition that the public had a right of access that may not be regulated for the benefit of an individual's free exercise rights, the court cited a line of cases that stands for a precisely contrary conclusion."' The sections that follow will discuss each of these conclusions.
The Establishment Clause Misapplied
Government defendants have traditionally raised the establishment clause as a defense to free exercise claims." 2 However, recent jurisprudence suggests an integrated view of the two religion clauses of the first amendment that would posit the common goal that all religions prosper or decline without the help or interference of government. The two religion clauses should not operate as a system of checks and balances, one upon the other. Chief See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 638 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) . 
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Justice Burger has recognized that such a view requires the resolution of apparent conflict between the two clauses:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise. I II The Court has recognized that at least since Everson v. Board of Education, 11 4 government may provide religious institutions with the basic services normally available to all other citizens without compromising establishment clause values.' 15 In the present case, Navajo plaintiffs sought protection from damage and desecration of a religious site located on federally managed land. Had the Navajo requested the same measures in order to protect an esthetic, economic, or ecological interest, the government would have had unquestioned authority to act. Yet the Badoni court held that the establishment clause barred the government from acting to protect a landmark geological structure simply because religious beliefs motivated the Navajo plaintiffs. Indeed, the Navajo plaintiffs did not actually seek affirmative government action on their behalf. Rather, they sought only that the government take steps to minimize the destructive impact of its management policies. In effect, the Navajo plaintiffs sought not to have their religion favored by government action, but only to have the impact of hostile government action reduced. 6 The Supreme Court has consistently found that affirmative government action which has only the incidental effect of benefiting religious believers and institutions falls safely within the limits of the establishment clause." 7 This rule of accommoda-tion is not, of course, unlimited; the three-part test most fully articulated in Nyquist"* 8 sets the outer limit for government accommodation under the establishment clause.
The Badoni court was simply wrong in its conclusion that government action to protect Navajo religious practices would have converted the Monument into "a government-managed religious shrine." 119 The Nyquist test demonstrates' otherwise. As the Navajo plaintiffs observed, "[T]he whole point is that Rainbow Bridge is a religious shrine; it was that long before it was declared to be a national monument."' 20 The court held that the accommodation that the Navajo requested would violate the second prong of Nyquist, which prohibits government action that has a primary effect of advancing one religion above all others.
12
' The second part of the Nyquist test, however, is framed in the alternative: The primary effect of the challenged government action must neither advance nor inhibit religion.
2 The court loaded the dice against the Navajo in its framing of the question. The government is now acting in a manner that impairs the practice of the Navajo religion. Rather than ask whether acceding to the Navajo request would implicate the government in action that has as its primary effect the advancement of the Navajo religion, the court should have inquired whether government refusal to modify its injurious activity impermissibly inhibited the Navajo in the free exercise of their religion. The trial court's factual findings, which the appellate court accepted, make it abundantly clear that the government action, or refusal to modify its action, fell short of the standard set forth in the second part of the Nyquist test. 
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The Public Forum Cases Misconstrued
The court held alternatively that regulations to protect Navajo practitioners from intrusion by tourists would be an impermissible burden on the right of those tourists to free access to the Monument.' 2 4 In support of this proposition the court cited a familiar line of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression cases. '2 Implying that government regulation of the tourist crowds at the Monument to minimize interference with the practice of the traditional Navajo religion would violate a first amendment right of the tourists, the court insisted that the case law supported such a proposition: "Government action has frequently been invalidated when it has denied the exercise of First Amendment rights compatible with public use." These cited cases, however, stand for a proposition quite contrary to that for which the court sought support. They stand instead for the proposition that the public right to free access to public forums must sometimes yield to the exercise of first amendment rights. In other words, these cases present a cogent argument for government intervention to protect the Navajo in their efforts to exercise their first amendment right to practice their religion. They do not support the government's refusal to act in order to avoid interfering with a tenuous first amendment right of tourists to the Monument.'" Such an accommodation would not run afoul of the establishment clause. Indeed, read in tandem, the religion clauses demand it. When government action directly burdens the free exercise of a particular religion, the government does not offer favored treatment to that religion when it acts to lift that burden.' 8 By choosing to balance the constitutional equities in favor of encouraging tourism, the court has effectively denied the Navajo the practice of their traditional religion. The court framed a choice between maintaining the Monument as a shrine or destroying it. Since it wrongly believed that the establishment clause of the first amendment barred the government from acting to preserve the Monument as a shrine, it voted for its destruction.
124. See note 108 supra. 125. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179, citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 384 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) ; Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320 (1968) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939 13 ' In Sequoyah the court dismissed the Cherokee claim under the Act as overborne by superseding legislation and thus did not examine the substance of the Act.' 3 2 In Badoni the court curtly refused even to consider the Navajo claims under the Act.' 33 If the Act does not apply to the situations presented by the Indian plaintiffs in Sequoyah and Badoni, it is difficult to imagine what import it might have beyond its praiseworthy but ineffective statement of policy and expression of good will. As the following examination of the legislative history of the Act reveals, Congress never seriously intended to put teeth into the Act. Despite Senator Abourezk's protests, the executive branch took the hint. It has not construed the Act to modify any existing state or federal law, 13 but has seen its purpose as merely to state federal policy and announce an agenda for administrative and regulatory reform.' 35 In his statement before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Larry L. Simms, an attorney from the Department of Justice, raised the administration's concerns about what he identified as establishment clause and federalism problems with the proposed Act. 136 Simms advanced an administration proposal that Congress resolve the federalism problem and the question of the status of prior conflicting legislation by inserting limiting would be construed as amending existing law." See id. at 12 (conclusion of committee):
The resolution does direct the administration to change its regulations and enforcement practices wherever necessary to protect and preserve native American religious cultural rights and practices. If changes cannot be made consistent with present statutory intent, then the President must report back to Congress his recommendations for changes in existing law which will require further legislative action. This conclusion comports substantially with the position taken by the Justice Department. See id. at 11 (remarks by Larry L. Simms):
Where conflicts arise that cannot be resolved within the existing statutory framework the proper course for the executive branch would be to seek legislation permitting Congress to declare its intent with regard to the balance to be struck between preservation of religious freedom and the achievement of the objectives of the specific programs involved. Congressman Udall, sponsor of the Act in the House, made it abundantly clear that Congress intended to limit the authority of the Act. The purpose of House Joint Resolution 738. . .is to insure that the policies and procedures of various Federal agencies, as they may impact upon the exercise of traditional Indian religious practices, are brought into compliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging the free exercise of religion. 136. S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 10-11 (statement of Larry L. Simms).
